The tiny victory of the ‘no’ side reveals Scotland’s strong perception of its identity and frightens the international community.

In the 18 September Scottish independence referendum, a slight majority of those who participated in the referendum voted ‘no’. Indeed, the ‘no’ side won with a narrow advantage – 55% to the 45% of the ‘yes’ side – while turnout was around 84% of eligible voters. Scotland decided to stay in the United Kingdom, meeting the expectations of Westminster, despite a poll that shook the unionist side 10 days prior to the vote, predicting victory for the pro-independence side.

It was an emotional loss for the Scottish movement for independence, which has passionate support among some within the country. Situated in the framework of a long difficult relationship is the current Scottish question, led by Salmond and the Scottish National Party, whose victory in the 2011 elections strengthened the nationalists’ control of Holyrood and brought Scotland to the referendum.

It would appear that the issue of Scottish independence has had an impact not only on the future of the nation itself, but is relevant to the overall geopolitical arrangement of Europe. It is part of a more general trend that affects the integrity of Europe, pushing other ‘stateless nations’ to seek their own independence. Indeed, it is only one among a chain of regions in the Western democracies calling for independence, such as Flanders in Belgium, or Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain. In fact, Catalonia’s support to Scotland’s claim for independence shows the extent to which European secessionist movements are connected to one another and benefit from one another’s success.

The international and national press have long held a stance of general indifference towards the issue of Scottish independence. A shift in public discourse occurred in early 2014, when opinion polls signaled that the Scottish nationalist cause was exceeding expectations only a few weeks before the referendum, when a YouGov survey showed a sudden loss of 22 points for the ‘no’ side (Limes, Hulsman). This prompted politicians to re-evaluate their somewhat complacent attitude toward the referendum, on both national and international ground. In a public press conference on 5 June, American President Barack Obama expressed his concern, wishing that the UK would remain ‘a strong, robust, united and effective partner’.

Some days later, the Chinese Prime Minister Li Quekiang struck a similar tone on the occasion of a three-day trip to the UK, stating that PRC would ‘welcome a strong, prosperous, and united United Kingdom’. In his speech, the Chinese Premier pointed out his concern for the alleged implications that Scottish secession would have on separatist ambitions abroad, doubtless preoccupied with what the possibility that people could decide their own fate might mean for Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang.

The political implications of the Scottish independence referendum highlight the fragility of the identitarian bond that links the states within the EU

The effects of the Scottish referendum have been felt far beyond London, as identified by the BBC monitoring report entitled ‘Scottish independence: World media suggests ‘domino effect’’, which shows the growing international press engagement on the matter. The shock stemming from the real possibility of a secession affecting the UK has its basis in the common and unquestionable assumption of a state’s continuity, as well as that of its indisputable borders and institutions. However, the official reactions of governments across the world sharply contrast the resonance that the referendum had among secessionist movements, such as those of Spain and of the Canadian province of Quebec.

The referendum led European governments to worry about a change in the geopolitical status quo of the European Union. A possible Scottish departure from the UK would have represented a decrease in the influence of a prominent ally for both the EU and the United States. The damage would have been visible not only in terms of international credibility, but the consequences would have also been felt in terms of defence policy. The UK without Scotland would mean a smaller British army, a different nuclear policy and, worth considering, is its potential impact on NATO. Furthermore, the threat of the success of the pro-independence camp has re-legitimized several secessionist movements in Europe, compelling local governments to take action. Despite the victory of the pro-unionist camp, the debate does not end here. Cameron’s draft law, meant to be ready by January 2015, aims to recognize many new Scottish powers. This action could lead London to concede further jurisdiction to Wales and Northern Ireland, and this would involve a radical change in the British domestic political and social balance.

On the other hand, Cameron has to balance the consequences stemming from new powers for Scotland. In the UK there are concerns related to the possible disadvantages this implies for the country. In fact, according to Conservative lawmaker James Wharton, as reported by Reuters, although England is the biggest British nation, it is the only region that does not enjoy any devolution of powers. Therefore, despite the tidy victory of the ‘no’ side at the polls, the level of uncertainty remains very high, and for the moment there is no definitive political solution on the horizon.

W. Walker, International Reactions to the Scottish Referendum, International Affairs 90: 4, 2014

M.Gillies, Londra Ballerà da sola?, in Limes, L’impero è Londra, p. 59-80,2014

Article written by Sabella Festa Campanile

For more on the topic of Scottish referendum, please check out the following article published in SEN:

Journal:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecaf.12028/abstract

It is impossible to talk about Somali identity without considering the Somali diaspora of recent years. According to the Global Initiative on Somali Refugees, there are approximately one million Somalis living abroad. This figure assumes a particular relevance to the study of Somali  identity in that it cannot only  be defined in terms of statehood, but which considers the entire Somali population, estimated to be around 10 million within its borders. If we are to examine a Somali national consciousness, which stretches beyond geographical borders along with the existence of a Somali consciousness within the country’s borders, it is first worth mentioning the existence of a strong sense of ‘Somaliness’ among the members of the Somali community who are living abroad.

The colonial divisions of the past are still ever present in Somalian society. Colonialism had given birth to a fragmented state divided into federal regions — each with its own local and fragile authority. The colonial experience within which modern Somali nationalism has developed should be considered in the context of an analysis of the country’s modern identity. A common consciousness stems from an awareness of the division of the colonial past. Along with the sense of nationhood, Somalis consider themselves strongly bound to each other by the common experiences of the language, the religion of Islam, and the nomadic pastoral culture. It is not a sense of state that provides Somali society with a specific group identity—there is no tradition in this sense—rather, the sense of Somali identity is based on ‘a long-standing sense of cultural uniqueness’.

Kinship lineages is the force that unites and binds the society together and within which the individual and social identity of the population must also be collocated, along with the adherence to Islam. Somali citizenship stresses the blood relationship between all Somalis; indeed, it is based on the concept of belonging to a family, group or clan . Specifically, clan identity represents within Somali society the foundation of their national identity.

However, a different discourse concerns the Somali diaspora youth and their perception of national identity. Over the past few decades the country has experienced territorial conflicts and political turmoil, where thousands of young Somalis have fled to different parts of the world. Ethiopian troops, with U.S. support, invaded Somalia in 2006 with the aim of ousting the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The current government, supported by the international community, is weaker than it was in 2006, and vast parts of the country’s territory are controlled by al-Shabaab, an extreme al-Quaeda linked Islamist group accused of being more violent than ICU ever was.

Despite the fact that Somalia was accustomed to significant waves of migration over the centuries, the most impressive flow of migrants  occurred after the collapse of the government in 1991. Since then, the despotism of the warlords, the controversial presence of al-Shabaab, the frequent interference of the international community, as well as the 2006 Ethiopian occupation, all contributed to worsen an already-unsafe environment and forced people to flee their homes in search of their fortunes abroad, in Middle Eastern countries, Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada. In particular, the long experience of ‘statelessness’ has had an impact on the youth of Somali diaspora. Worth mentioning is the impact of the Ethiopian occupation of Mogadishu coupled with the Western ‘War on Terror’ since 2001, and the risk of becoming a target of violence.

According to Khadra Elmi, a Somali researcher and traveller, the issue of identity requires a different approach that examines the impact of the Somali diaspora on young refugees and the generation born, raised and educated in Western schools overseas.  If the older generation of Somali migrants reconfirmed their social identity in terms of clanship, in the case of the younger Somali generation, the process involves different elements. The capacity of the youngest to establish a link with their culture of belonging, even if abstract, resides in their relation to parents and friends and is strongly linked to the country where they have resettled. The comprehension of ‘self’ and ‘other’ is determined by their history of mobility and is shaped by the relation they have with the new environment. The way in which this primary network deals with the concept of identity affects the image they have of their uniqueness.

Nonetheless, Muslim identity is the element which underlies the perception of individuality. The reaffirmation of Islamic values through a strong relation with religion is a basic element in the self-representation of the younger Somali generation of migrants  and for the new generation born in exile. In a context in which the core values of their culture are called into question, individuals’ natural reaction is to ‘extremize’ its more controversial aspects. According to Elmi, this underlies the strong self-identification with Muslim culture in the understanding and shaping of their Somali identity for young Somalis abroad.

I. M. Lewis, Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox, Africa, 74 (4), 2004

K. Elmi, Distant Voices and the ties that bind: Identity, Politics and Somali Diaspora Youth, Accord, Issue 21, 2010

M. V. Hoehne, Political Representation in Somalia: Citizenship, clanism and territoriality, Accord, Issue 21, 2010

Article written by Sabella Festa Campanile

For more on the topic of Somali ethnicity and nationalism, please check out the following article published in SEN:

Journal:http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1754-9469.2011.01103.x/abstract