Understanding Nationalism in the Graveyard of Empire: The Ukraine Case and Historiography of Nationalism (I)

Introduction

In February of this year we witnessed the beginning of the 2014 Crimean Crisis. For decades this region, home to an ethnically Russian majority, as well as eastern Ukraine more widely, has been oriented more towards Russia than (western) Ukraine. Political instability in Ukraine centred in Kiev and a decision by the President Viktor Yanukovych to reverse moves for closer ties with the European Union in favour of deepening those with Russia, led to Yanukovych fleeing the capital after an outbreak of violence between security forces and protesters there. This was followed by disturbances in the Crimean region, during which armed pro-Russian and Russian state forces began to take over the region. Following this, the Crimean Parliament called for a referendum on the region’s constitutional status. Subsequently, based on the referendum’s outcome, the Crimean Parliament decided on secession from Ukraine in order to join the Russian Federation. Moscow agreed, and on March 18th the Russian government and the separatist Crimean government signed a treaty to that effect.  The annexation – the first of its kind anywhere in Europe since 1945 – was internationally condemned as illegal and illegitimate, and the region remains in dispute. Since then, an armed conflict has been in occurrence between Ukrainian troops and separatist militias, as well as with Russian forces inside Ukraine. Spreading out from Crimea, a general conflict has arisen in eastern Ukraine between the Ukrainian state and other breakaway ‘republics’ (including in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast areas, both part of the larger Donbass region) that have oriented themselves towards Russia. In August, in a conference in Yalta (where, perhaps significantly the map of post-war Europe was decided by the Allied powers during the Second World War between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin), Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed that under no circumstances would the annexation of Crimea be reversed. Unrecognized elections that have just taken place in Donetsk and Luhansk (where there are now around 15,000 Russian troops) may, as argued by Ukraine scholar Taras Kuzio, establish ‘a de facto new border with Ukraine.’

Orthodox monks pray next to armed servicemen near Russian army vehicles outside a Ukrainian border guard post in the Crimean town of Balaclava on 1 March 2014

Seventy years ago, in his seminal study The Idea of  Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background (1944),  the historian Hans Kohn distinguished between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ forms of nationalism. Since then, despite its  shortcomings, this distinction, and its re-workings in forms  such as the ‘civic’-‘ethnic’ dichotomy remains highly  influential in its different forms, being a kind of ‘theoretical  common sense’ in nationalism studies.

For Kohn, while ‘Western’ forms of nationalism were based fundamentally on ideas of citizenship as opposed to ethnic belonging, ‘Eastern’ forms of nationalism were based on a collectivist and illiberal conception of ethnic descent and commonality. Again, this seems to match with the nature of the Crimean conflict: ethnic Russians have rejected established state boundaries in favour of far more ‘meaningful’ commonalities with the Russian Federation based on common culture and historical memories.

While Kohn did not believe that his distinction matched  exactly with European geography, it has not been uncommon  for central and eastern Europe, for most of its history a region  contested by rival empires, to be seen as a borderland in which  different forms of nationalism have come into conflict, often  violent.

In the Crimean conflict we can see, arguably, Kohn’s conflict played out in literal terms, in an antagonism between ‘west’ and ‘east’ in Ukraine. This is, after all, a ‘common sense’ interpretation of the conflict, insofar as it matches the ‘common sense’ distinction of civic and ethnic nationalisms among many scholars of nationalism (as noted by Rogers Brubaker in his essay on civic and ethnic nationalism in his 2004 book Ethnicity Without Groups).

Yet how useful are these ‘common sense’ notions to understanding the conflict? Does the political and media narrative hold weight in terms of what scholars have come to understand about nationalist fissures in Ukraine, a ‘graveyard’ of three empires?

 The situation in eastern Ukraine is emblematic of a number of problems central to the study of nationalism: the relationship between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions of nation and nationalism, the shaping and contesting of nation-state borders, the presence of disputed regions and ‘non-national’ regional affiliations, the relations between ‘homeland’ and ‘diaspora’ nationalisms, as well as differing and conflicting narratives of ‘national(ist)’ historical memory, to name only a few (the Kiev ‘uprising’ of November 2013-February 2014 has been described as both a ‘Cossack Rebellion’, and a ‘neo-Nazi coup’).
Ukraine: Language and political divisions (Source: Reuters)

With more than half a year having passed since the beginning of  the conflict that remains ongoing, and has now claimed over  4,000 lives since April, and may yet escalate further with the  order for the deployment of more Ukrainian troops to the disputed  eastern regionsSEN Online will provide a brief and accessible  survey of some recent important English-language scholarship on  the history of nationalism in Ukraine and the Ukrainian-Russian  borderland, and seek to examine its relevance for how  contemporary affairs in Ukraine may be analysed and  understood. This will complement a more extensive analysis of the conflict in Ukraine that will appear in a special issue of Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism next year (15.1, April 2015).

The theoretical study of nationalism came  relatively late to the analysis of the nations of the Soviet Union, with sustained archival research unencumbered by political  constraints by both Soviet and international scholars not really  being possible until the post-1991 period. As such, events such as  those that have taken place in the Ukraine in the past several  months, less than twenty-five years since the end of the Soviet Union, provide an opportune moment to reflect on how recent historical scholarship on nationalism has come to understand the problem of nationalism in one of the classic ‘graveyards’ of empire and post-imperial ‘borderlands’.

The first part of the survey will consider how historians have observed the west-east divide in Ukrainian history, and its significance for Ukraine and nationalisms in the country.

NB: Images sourced from Reuters

References

‘Ukraine Crisis: Russia vows troops will stay’, BBC News, 2/3/14

‘Ukraine Crisis: Russia isolated in UN vote’, BBC News, 15/3/14

‘Crimean Parliament formally applies to join Russia’, BBC News, 17/3/14

‘Crimea Crisis’ Russian President Putin’s speech annotated’, BBC News, 19/3/14

‘Putin to decide next moves in standoff with West over Ukraine’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11, 150, 14/8/14

Russia annexes Donbass but loses Ukraine’, Financial Times, 4/11/14

‘Ukraine crisis: Poroshenko orders troops to key cities’, BBC News, 4/11/14

‘Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West by Andrew Wilson – review’, The Guardian, 5/11/14

Books

Rogers Brubaker, Ethncity Without Groups (London, Harvard University Press, 2004)

Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background (New York, Macmillan, 1945)

The Long March of Hindu Nationalism

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From April to May, 2014, India, the world’s largest democracy, held its general elections, with a clear victory for Hindu nationalism at the polls. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a right-wing Hindu nationalist party, gained a remarkable success by securing the majority of seats in parliament. Historical significance of this electoral success needs to be considered in the light of the diverse political strategies that the BJP and the RSS have utilized since 1980s.

The BJP, established in 1980, is the successor of the Hindu nationalist parties Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951) and Janata Party (1977). The party advocated for Hindutva that emphasizes Hinduism as the basis of Indian nationalism. It is generally described as the ‘political wing’ (Hansen 1999:3) of a large family of Hindu nationalist organizations known as Sangh Parivar, established and led by a militant nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Although the party has no official association with the RSS, many leading actors of the BJP were recruited from the RSS.  For many scholars, the fact that many leaders and cadres of the BJP have RSS backgrounds shows the organic link between the two organizations (for RSS-BJP association, see Brass 1997:16-17; Nussbaum 2007:170; Basu 2001:182). One RSS leader described the relationship as one where these organizations are bound by ‘fraternal ties’ and share common goals (see Udayakumar 2005:127).

The BJP was not able to garner mass electoral support during its early years. Throughout the 1990s, however, the party increased its electoral appeal and managed to get more than 25% of the votes in 1998 general elections. Despite some setbacks throughout the 2000s, its popular support on the polls never went below 18%. Hence, since 1990s, the BJP succeeded to entrench itself as the largest opposition to the Congress Party in India.

In this period, Hindu nationalist movement used different hegemony building strategies. Subsequently, this two-decade long electoral popularization of the BJP in India was accompanied by nationalist mobilization on the ground as well. This was possibly because the BJP is not an ordinary populist nationalist party; being linked with the RSS enabled the BJP to be a ‘highly motivated cadre’ (Swain 2001:72) on the one hand, and a capacity to ‘assume the character of a social movement which can mobilize on a larger scale than any other political party in India’ (Basu 2001:181) on the other. This peculiar organizational character revealed itself in the capacity of utilizing different action repertoires to gain the support for large masses for Hindu nationalism.

One of the most notorious forms of political action that the Hindu nationalist movement has utilized is the violent mobilization of the Hindu masses. Despite the large participation of ordinary civilians in ethno-religious riots, Hindu nationalist organizations, particularly the RSS and the BJP, visibly play a large part in these violent mobilizations. For instance, the religious rath yatra of 1990 in Ayodhya, which resulted in large scale ethno-religious riots, was initiated by the BJP leader Advani (Brass 1997). Different authors have argued that the Gujarat riots were not an organically occurring social reaction, but were ‘planned and organised events, coordinated by a relatively small group of people’ (Berenschot 2009:417; also see Brass 2003).

Mobilizing Hindu population for communal violence played a key role in polarizing Indian society along ethno-religious lines, which proved to be a key tool for Hindu nationalist movement to gain popularity among the country’s electorate. Through various ‘extra-parliamentary agitations’, the BJP/RSS was able to build a Hindu voting bloc that brought together various social groups with ‘divergent interests’ (De Leon, Desai and Tuğal 2009:204-205). Hence, violent mobilization became an effective strategy for the BJP to increase its electoral fortunes throughout 1990s (see Wilkinson 2004 and Hansen 1999). This electoral logic was also present in the deadly riots of Gujarat in 2002 (see Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012).

A rather less discussed aspect of the rise of Hindu nationalism has been the role of the ‘tactic of social welfare’ (Jaffrelot 1999). Various RSS-affiliated organizations, which receive significant amount of overseas donations/funds from the Indian diaspora since 1990s, provide free health care and education services among the poorer segments of the Indian society. This ‘quiet yet unrelenting grassroots social welfare work among urban slums’ increased the legitimacy of the RSS in a period of increasing economic vulnerability and informalisation of employment due to neoliberal economic policies (Chidambaram 2012: 304-307). Hence, the ‘tactic of social welfare’ proved to be an effective way to organize and mobilize marginalized groups that are beyond the reach of welfare services provided by the state.

By successfully utilizing these different strategies of political action, the Hindu nationalist movement succeeded in emerging as an alternative socio-political power in the last three decades. It remains to be seen whether or not being the ruling party of India will force the BJP to tone down its radical nationalist rhetoric and violent strategies.         

References

Basu, A. 2001. ‘The Dialectics of Hindu Nationalism’. In The Success of India’s Democracy, ed. A. Kohli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berenschot, W. 2009. ‘Rioting as Maintaining Relations: Hindu-Muslim Violence and Political Mediation in Gujarat India.’ Civil Wars 11 (4): 414–433.

Brass, P. R. 2003. The production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India. Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press.

Brass, P. R. 1997. Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Bunsha, D. 2006. Scarred: Experiments with Violence in Gujarat. New Delhi: Penguin.

Chidambaram, S. 2012. ‘The “Right” Kind of Welfare in South India’s Urban Slums: Seva vs. Patronage and the Success of Hindu Nationalist Organizations’. Asian Survey 52 (2): 298–320.

De Leon, C., Desai, M., & Tuğal, C. 2009. ‘Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages’. Sociological Theory 27 (3): 193–219.

Dhattiwala, R., & Biggs, M. 2012. ‘The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002’. Politics & Society 40 (4): 483 –516.

Hansen, T. B. 1999. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Islam, S. 2011. RSS Primer: Based on Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Documents. New Delhi: Pharos Media & Publishing Pvt Ltd.

Jaffrelot, C. 1999. The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian politics, 1925 to the 1990s: Strategies of Identity-building, Implantation and Mobilisation. New Delhi: Penguin Books.

Jaffrelot, C. 1996. The Hindu Nationalist Violence in India. New York: Columbia University Press.

Kinnvall, C. 2006. Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India: The Search for Ontological Security. New York: Routledge.

Nussbaum, M. C. 2007. The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India’s Future. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Sridharan, E., & Varshney, A. 2001. Toward Moderate Pluralism: Political Parties in India. In L. Diamond, & R. Gunther, Political Parties and Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Swain, P. C. 2001. Bharatiya Janata Party: Profile and Performance. New Delhi: A.P.H. Pub. Corp.

Udayakumar, S. P. 2005. Presenting the Past: Anxious History and Ancient Future in Hindutva India. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Wilkinson, S. I. 2004. Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SEN News Bites: 27 October -1 November 2014

 

 

 

 

 

The Diplomat (27/10/2014) features a piece on the challenges of a federal settlement of Nepal that is being negotiated in run up to the adoption of a new constitution in the country in January 2015.

The Guardian (29/10/2014) reports on the Labour Party’s intention to allow Ofsted to inspect religious education in faith schools to better understand its possible impact on ethnic and religious situation in the UK.

The Sydney Morning Herald (29/10/2014) reports the results of a national survey in Australia indicating heightened attention to national security and an increasing sense of nationalism in the country.

RIA Novosti (30/10/2014) reports on a recent press conference by the Syrian Grand Mufti Ahmad Badreddin Hassoun in which he warned against attempts to establish a state on a religious and national basis.

The Washington Post (31/10/2014) reports on the launch of an innovative text messaging service in eastern Kenya aimed at easing ethnic tensions through verifying information, preventing the spread false rumours and misinformation.

News.Az (01/11/2014) features an interview with Peter Tase, a research scholar reflecting on the impact of the recent meeting held between the Presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and France on the geopolitical environment in the Caucasus and the dynamics of conflict regulation between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

News compiled by Anastasia Voronkova

If you would like to write a response to any of these news stories, please email us at sen@lse.ac.uk.

 

 

 

SEN News Bites: 15-26 October 2014

 

 

The Guardian (15/10/2014) features an opinion piece on the recent ‘football war’ between Serbia and Albania and the implications it might have for longer-term peace in the Balkans.

I24News (20/10/2014) reports the results of a new survey, according to which five of the seven Middle Eastern countries surveyed identified religious and ethnic hatred as the top threat to the world.

Salon (23/10/2014) reports the results of new research linking climate change and violence, including ethnic violence and ethnic riots.

Tass (Russian News Agency) (24/10/2014) summarises a recent speech by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in which he advocated a separation between extreme nationalism and the promotion of national interests.

Deutsche Welle (24/10/2014) reports the key findings of a new report analysing the obstacles and challenges of creating a new sense of national identity for Myanmar’s Rohingya community.

The New Indian Express (26/10/2014) reports on the release of a new stamp in India commemorating the 150th birth anniversary of Anagarika Dharmapala, considered to be an iconic figure behind the revival of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.

The Peninsula (26/10/2014) announces the release of a new documentary (to be shown in Doha) highlighting forced disappearances in Sri Lanka from the 1980s up to recent times.

 

 

News compiled by Anastasia Voronkova

If you would like to write a response to any of these news stories, please email us at sen@lse.ac.uk.